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The answer to Lord Ellenborough's famous rhetorical question,
"Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the whole
world?," may well be yes, where the world has conferred such
binding authority through treaty.
-Justice Steven Breyer'
I. INTRODUCTION
In its previous term, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the federal
habeas corpus petition of Jose Medellin, a Mexican national sentenced to
death by a Texas court after his conviction for the rape and murder of
two girls. Medellin claimed state officials had violated the Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations (VCCR) by failing to notify him of his
right to assistance from the Mexican consulate. The International Court
of Justice (ICJ) addressed his claim in the Case Concerning Avena and
Other Nationals in 2003, finding that the VCCR confers individual
rights2 and that a violation of the VCCR requires "review and reconsid-
eration"3 in U.S. courts notwithstanding the procedural default rule.4
By granting certiorari in Medellin v. Dretke,5 the Supreme Court cre-
ated an opportunity to reassess its decision in Breard v. Greene,6 the last
case in which it considered consular rights claims under the VCCR, and
reconcile U.S. and ICJ jurisprudence on the issue. When the Court then
dismissed the certiorari as improvidently granted, it failed to clarify
whether ICJ decisions regarding the VCCR constitute binding domestic
law. U.S. courts consequently remain rudderless in adjudicating claims
of article 36 violations, particularly with regard to whether such viola-
tions raised in federal habeas petitions may be procedurally defaulted
and still comply with the requirements of the VCCR.
This Comment examines, through principles of public international
law and U.S. jurisprudence, the relationship between U.S. courts and the
ICJ to determine if the former are indeed bound by the latter's decisions,
proprio motu, or if instead some Executive action is required to make the
1. Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1041 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting), quoted in
Andreas Paulus, From Neglect to Defiance? The United States and International Adjudication,
15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 783, 783 (2004).
2. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1,
at para. 40 (Mar. 31) [hereinafter Avena]. See also LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 1,
at para. 77 (June 27) [hereinafter LaGrand].
3. LaGrand, supra note 2, para. 121.
4. Id. para. 112.
5. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005).
6. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
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decisions binding on the judiciary. Part of this examination will entail a
discussion of the potential for dialogue between the ICJ and U.S. courts
to "pierce the veil of sovereignty" that traditionally conceals the inner
workings of sovereign states from the scrutiny of international tribunals.
Based on this assessment, the Comment then addresses how U.S. courts
may approach the requirements of Avena and LaGrand in light of the
Supreme Court's refusal to specifically address the effect of those deci-
sions in lower courts.
Part I recounts the events surrounding Medellin and briefly summa-
rizes the majority and dissenting opinions in the case. Part II describes
the three findings in LaGrand and Avena that are most important for
U.S. courts considering article 36 in habeas petitions: first, article 36
confers rights on individuals and grants them standing to enforce those
rights and seek meaningful remedies; second, procedural bars cannot
preclude meaningful review and reconsideration of cases involving arti-
cle 36 violations; and third, meaningful review and reconsideration is
necessarily a judicial task, excluding state clemency proceedings.
Part III examines the ways in which the LaGrand and Avena deci-
sions might bind U.S. courts. It argues that the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution not only clearly integrates international treaties into
U.S. domestic law but also incorporates interpretations of those treaties
by international tribunals such as the ICJ. Thus, through its self-
executing decision in Avena, the ICJ engaged in a direct dialogue with
the U.S. judiciary.
While the Supremacy Clause forms the basis of this argument, it
does not address all aspects of the current dispute, particularly the find-
ings in Avena and LaGrand that run contrary to current Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Part IV addresses this conundrum, examining the history
of the Supremacy Clause and existing legal doctrine to determine how
U.S. courts may implement the spirit of the ICJ decisions without flying
in the face of Breard. The finding of individual rights in article 36 of the
VCCR will inform a great deal of this discussion. Part IV also briefly
discusses why the last-in-time rule need not necessarily apply in a con-
flict between the VCCR and the U.S. statutes codifying procedural
default rules. Part V concludes.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND MEDELLIN
A. Granting Cert and the Bush Proclamation
On April 13, 2004, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
denied Jose Medellin's habeas petition on procedural default grounds,
Winter 20061
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holding that the VCCR did not confer individual rights.7 The court re-
lied on Breard to conclude that such claims, like constitutional claims,
can be procedurally defaulted even in death penalty cases.8 The Fifth
Circuit was adamant in favoring its own precedents and those of the
Supreme Court over the decisions of the ICJ in Avena and LaGrand
"until taught otherwise by the Supreme Court."9
In their application for certiorari, the Medellin petitioners asked the
Supreme Court to consider two questions: first, should U.S. courts ap-
ply the Avena decision in full, granting review and reconsideration of
article 36 violations without resort to procedural default doctrines?
Second, should U.S. courts give effect to the LaGrand and Avena deci-
sions as a matter of "international judicial comity" and in the interest
of uniform treaty interpretation?' ° The first question challenged the
Court to decide whether the decisions of the ICJ are a self-executing,
and therefore binding, part of the VCCR. The second question asked
the Court, in the event it found ICJ decisions were not binding on U.S.
courts, to delineate the boundaries of the comity doctrine and to ex-
plain how courts should consider ICJ decisions outside a level of strict
legal obligation.
After the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Medellin case, the
Bush administration filed a brief with the Court in which it stated that
the "United States will discharge its international obligations under...
Avena ... by having State courts give effect to the decision in accor-
dance with general principles of comity ... .""-further complicating
the relationship between the ICJ and U.S. courts. The Bush proclama-
tion invited the Supreme Court to consider the relationship between the
U.S. judiciary and the ICJ as one of comity, whereby mutual respect,
and not legal obligation, steers the decisions of each body.'2 The U.S.
7. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004) (referring to United States v.
Jimenez-Nava, 243 E3d 192 (5th Cir. 2001)).
8. Medellin, 371 F.3d at 280.
9. Id.
10. See Brief for the Petitioner at I, Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928).
11. Memorandum for the Attorney General, Feb. 28, 2005, at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2006) (empha-
sis added); see also Charles Lane, Mexicans on Death Row to Get Hearings: Bush Tells Texas
Courts to Review Cases of 51 Denied Consular Aid, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at A2.
12. Comity as a legal concept occupies a space somewhere between legal obligation
and mere courtesy. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) ("Comity in the legal
sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one hand nor of mere courtesy and
good will on the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to interna-
tional duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are




government argued that the presidential determination, "like an execu-
tive agreement, has independent legal force and effect, and contrary
state rules must give way under the Supremacy Clause."'" After the
United States filed its brief, a spokesman for Texas disputed the author-
ity of the presidential determination, stating that it exceeded "the
constitutional bounds for federal authority."'14 Medellin then moved to
stay the Supreme Court proceedings to pursue enforcement of the
Avena decision in Texas courts under the authority of the presidential
determination. The Court, however, proceeded with oral arguments on
the merits.
B. Dismissing Cert
On May 23, 2005, the Supreme Court dismissed its certiorari as
improvidently granted.'5 In a per curium opinion, the Court described
five unresolved threshold issues that argued against a conclusive ruling
on Medellin's claim. First, Medellin had not shown that Reed v. Far-
ley, 6 which requires violations of statutory rights to meet a
"fundamental defect" test before receiving recognition in post-
conviction proceedings, did not bar his claim." Second, Medellin had
yet to overcome the deference accorded to state habeas proceedings
absent a showing that the adjudication "was contrary to, or an unrea-
sonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court."'" Third, because a habeas petitioner "cannot
enforce a 'new rule' of law," the Court could not address Medellin's
claim without first deciding how the Avena decision impacted U.S. ju-
risprudence.'9 Fourth, Medellin lacked a certificate of appealability,
which is available only upon a showing of a denial of a constitutional
right, and he had failed to demonstrate that "his allegation of a treaty
violation could satisfy this standard.' 20 Finally, Medellin did not show
he had exhausted all state court remedies.2'
In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice
Scalia, agreed with the dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted
and rejected the dissent's proposal to remand Medellin's claim to the
13. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, Medellin,
125 S Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928).
14. Hugh Dellios & Steve Mills, U.S. Orders Reviews for Mexican Inmates, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 9, 2005, at C5.
15. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2089 (2005).
16. See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994).
17. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2090.
18. Id. at 2091.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2091-92.
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Fifth Circuit as "leaving unresolved a bewildering array of questions. 22
Dismissing the writ, in contrast, granted the Texas courts the opportu-
nity to provide reconsideration of Medellin's claim and avoided the
"formidable threshold issues ... that deter definitive answers to the
questions presented in the petition for certiorari."23
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer,
dissented from the per curium opinion. The "tentative predictions"
driving the dismissal of the writ, in her view, were not "reason enough
to avoid questions that are as compelling now as they were when we
granted a writ of certiorari. 24 The dissent further found that the Texas
court's rejection of Medellin's claim did not "adjudicate the merits of
the relevant federal question-whether, under article 36(2), the treaty
overrides state procedural default rules."25 Further, contrary to the Su-
preme Court's precedents, the Texas court "reasoned that private
individuals (as opposed to offended nations) can never enforce any
treaty in court.2 6 Therefore, the Texas proceedings merited no defer-
ence, and Medellin's claim should have been remanded to the Fifth
Circuit for de novo proceedings.27
Two less substantial dissents followed Justice O'Connor's opinion.
Justice Souter agreed that Medellin's case should have been remanded
to the Fifth Circuit, but with the caveat that the court should "take no
further action until the anticipated Texas litigation responding to the
President's position had run its course," potentially disposing of the
need for a federal habeas petition. Justice Breyer, in his dissent, also
advocated returning the case to the Fifth Circuit, although he expected
the court to recognize the exigent circumstances favoring a stay.29
III. BACKGROUND ON LAGRAND AND AVENA
FROM THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE
Both LaGrand and Avena dealt with violations of article 36 of the
VCCR, which requires, inter alia, that states parties allow foreign de-
tainees to contact and freely communicate with their consulate.
22. Id. at 2093 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 2095.
24. Id. at 2096 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 2099.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2100.
28. Id. at 2106 (Souter, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 2107 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30. Article 36 provides:
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Article 36 demands that states give "full effect" to these require-
ments.31
Of primary importance in both the LaGrand and Avena cases was
the application of procedural default rules by U.S. courts. In U.S. federal
courts, before a state criminal defendant can make a claim for relief he
must already have presented the claim in state court.
3 In both LaGrand
and Avena, U.S. courts procedurally defaulted the petitioners' article 36
claims in their habeas petitions because they had failed to raise the
claims in state court criminal proceedings. Fundamental to both cases
was the question of how closely the ICJ would examine the U.S. crimi-
nal justice system to determine whether the United States had complied
with its commitments under article 36.
A. Important Holdings from LaGrand and Avena for U.S. Courts
U.S. courts, at both the federal and state level, have in past decisions
considered three important holdings from LaGrand and Avena: first, the
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals
of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the send-
ing State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have
the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular
officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its con-
sular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to
custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or de-
tention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said
authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under
this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State
who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him
and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to
visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in
their district in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall
refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or
detention if he expressly opposes such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in confor-
mity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso,
however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261 [hereinafter VCCR].
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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VCCR confers individual rights; second, the United States must grant
"review and reconsideration" in cases involving article 36; and third,
clemency proceedings do not constitute sufficient review and reconsid-
eration. In many ways, these holdings diverge from or directly conflict
with the Supreme Court's Breard decision, which it issued before either
LaGrand or Avena.
The first of these holdings involves the admissibility of VCCR
claims under the Optional Protocol of 1963, which gives the ICJ com-
pulsory jurisdiction over disputes arising "out of the interpretation or
application of the [Vienna] Convention., 3  The ICJ's holding in the La-
Grand case that article 36(1) confers rights on individuals was
significant in that it granted standing to Germany to raise claims based
on diplomatic protection under the 1963 Optional Protocol.34 The court
based its decision on a textual interpretation of article 36, pointing out
that the language of article 36(1) specifically addresses the detainee's
rights in addition to the rights of the mother state.35 Based on this obser-
vation, the court held that article 36(1) "creates individual rights, which
... may be invoked in this Court by the national State of the detained
person. 36
The second significant holding of the LaGrandAvena cases ad-
dresses remedies, particularly the duties of the United States with regard
to a violation of article 36. As an initial matter, the ICJ in La Grand held
that its power to award remedies stemmed directly from its jurisdiction
over the dispute.37 Specifically, "[w]here jurisdiction exists over a par-
ticular matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is required by the Court
to consider ... remedies., 38 Based on this authority, the LaGrand court
went on to declare that, due to its violation of the article 36 rights of the
LaGrand brothers, "the United States of America, by means of its own
choosing, shall allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction
and sentence [of German nationals] by taking account of the violation of
the rights set forth in [the VCCR]. 39 Despite leaving the determination
of the means of "review and reconsideration" to the United States, the
33. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
34. LaGrand, supra note 2, para. 77. See Bruno Simma & Carsten Hoppe, From La-
Grand and Avena to Medellin-A Rocky Road Toward Implementation, 14 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. (forthcoming 2006).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. para. 48. See also Simmna & Hoppe, supra note 34.
38. LaGrand, supra note 2, para. 48.
39. Id. para. 128 (emphasis added).
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court found that the procedural default rules applicable in U.S. courts
prevented the "full effect" of individual rights under the VCCR. °
U.S. courts typically require prejudice to the detainee to overcome
procedural default.4' Because the individual right under article 36 is one
of notification and access and not necessarily consular assistance, the
harm caused by a violation of article 36 is difficult to determine. 2 In ad-
dition, because Arizona had already executed the LaGrand brothers, the
ICJ in LaGrand did not explicitly decide how plaintiffs must show
prejudice in domestic courts:
It is immaterial for the purposes of the present case whether the
LaGrands would have sought consular assistance[,] ... whether
Germany would have rendered such assistance, or whether a dif-
ferent verdict would have been rendered. It is sufficient that the
Convention conferred these rights, and that Germany and the
LaGrands were in effect prevented by the breach ... from exer-
cising them, had they so chosen. 3
While the ICJ seemed to suggest that prejudice need not be shown to
establish a violation, the court did not determine whether it is a neces-
sary trigger for remedies." Needless to say, the answer to this question
depends on whether the procedural default rule as used by U.S. courts
fits within the ambit of "review and reconsideration."
The ICJ resolved this issue, albeit somewhat less than satisfactorily,
in the Avena case. Faced with a myriad of possible applications of the
LaGrand decision within U.S. courts, 5 the court attempted to clarify
"review and reconsideration." In reference to the freedom of the United
States to choose the means by which it conducts review and reconsidera-
tion, the ICJ stated:
It should be underlined ... that this freedom in the choice of
means for such review and reconsideration is not without quali-
fication.., such review and reconsideration has to be carried out
"by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the
Convention"... [T]he Court would point out that what is crucial
40. Id. para. 91.
41. Douglas Cassel, International Remedies in National Criminal Cases: ICJ Judgment
in Germany v. United States, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 69, 83 (2002).
42. Joan Fitzpatrick, The Unreality of International Law in the United States and the
LaGrand Case, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 427,431 (2002).
43. LaGrand, supra note 2, para. 74.
44. Cassel, supra note 41, at 83.
45. The scope of the interpretation of "review and reconsideration," as well as the re-
spect for the determination that art. 36 confers individual rights, runs the gamut from
compliance to disobedience. See infra Part II.
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in the review and reconsideration process is the existence of a
procedure which guarantees that full weight be given to the vio-
lation of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention, whatever
may be the outcome of such review and reconsideration. 46
By requiring a procedure giving full weight to the violation of the
rights set forth in the VCCR, the ICJ suggested that prejudice to the de-
tainee may be considered, not in finding a violation of article 36, but in
determining what remedies are appropriate. The issue, in essence, is not
the correctness of the conviction or the sentence but rather their causal
connection to the violations committed.47 Thus, the court drew a fine
line, approving the doctrine of harmless error (which reviews whether an
error was actually harmful to the defendant) while rejecting the doctrine
of procedural default (which prevents review of any kind). 8
Finally, in addition to finding that review and reconsideration must
give full weight to a violation's prejudicial impact on a detainee, the ICJ
held in the Avena case that "the process of review and reconsideration
should occur within the overall judicial proceedings relating to the indi-
vidual defendant concerned.' ' 9 In making this determination, the court
rejected the U.S. argument that executive clemency procedures are a le-
gitimate and effective part of meeting the requirement for review and
reconsideration. 0 The court continued:
[W]hat is at issue in the present case is not whether executive
clemency as an institution is or is not an integral part of the "ex-
isting laws and regulations of the United States," but whether the
clemency process as practiced within the criminal justice system
... can ... qualify as an appropriate means for undertaking the
effective "review and reconsideration ....
The ICJ's assertion that the review and reconsideration required in
LaGrand is a distinctly judicial consideration can be read in two ways.
On a cursory level, the ICJ stayed within the boundaries of its judicial
charter. As it is already in the uncharted territory of imposing an interna-
tional will on U.S. domestic courts, the court declined to review the
efficacy of clemency proceedings beyond stating that they "do[] not ap-
pear to meet the requirements described in [LaGrand].""' On a deeper
level, the ICJ's insistence on judicial consideration can be read as an at-
46. Avena, supra note 2, paras. 131, 139 (emphasis added).
47. Dinah L. Shelton, Case Note, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nation-
als (Mexico v. United States), 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 559, 566 (2004).
48. Id.
49. Avena, supra note 2, para. 141 (emphasis added).
50. Id. para. 136.
51. Id. para. 143.
[Vol. 27:657
Rebus Sic Stantibus
tempt to place the problem outside the realm of politics (as clemency
proceedings are by nature more political and less judicial) and engage
U.S. courts in a dialogue between learned and mutually respectful judi-
cial bodies. As described below, this posture contributed to the general
discussion of the binding nature of ICJ decisions on U.S. courts, as well
as the issue, clearly a sensitive one for the ICJ, of the limits of that bind-
ing nature.
B. A Diverging (and Dated) Supreme Court Jurisprudence
One of the primary reasons for the divergence in interpretation of
consular rights between U.S. courts and the ICJ is the fact that the Su-
preme Court's major examination of article 36 in Breard v. Greene came
before either Avena or LaGrand. In addition, while the ICJ had the ad-
vantage of time and multiple cases to fine tune its treatment of consular
rights, the Court's analysis of article 36 in Breard was short, imprecise,
and insufficiently contrary to the ICJ's decisions to supply U.S. courts
with a clear alternative precedent.
The Supreme Court first dealt with procedural default rules gener-
ally in Breard,2 holding that procedurally defaulting article 36 claims in
federal habeas petitions was permissible because the procedural rules of
the forum state govern treaty implementation.53 The Court further em-
phasized the language of the VCCR:
This proposition is embodied in the Vienna Convention itself,
which provides that the rights expressed in the Convention "shall
be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State," providing that "said laws and regulations must
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights
accorded under this Article are intended." 5
The problem with this determination is that the Court glossed over the
language concerning the "full effect" of article 36 that the ICJ meticu-
lously articulated in LaGrand. The Court thus ignored one of the most
important provisions of the VCCR.
The Supreme Court's cursory treatment of the "full effect" require-
ment is somewhat understandable given the second part of the Breard
decision. The Court acknowledged that the VCCR "arguably confers on
an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest,""5 but it
52. The Court points out that "[i]t is a rule in this country that assertions of error in
criminal proceedings must first be raised in state court in order to form the basis for relief in
habeas." Breard, 523 U.S. at 375.
53. Id.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 376.
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quickly cabined this determination: "Breard's ability to obtain relief
based on violations of the Vienna Convention is subject to the subse-
quently enacted rule, just as any claim arising under the United States
Constitution would be.' 5 6 The "subsequently enacted rule" in this case is
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
which codified the procedural default rule for federal habeas petitions. 7
The Court held that Breard's rights under the VCCR were limited to the
extent that his claims must follow the procedures enumerated in AEDPA
or potentially be defaulted."
IV. PACTA SUNTA SERVANDA-PIERCING THE SOVEREIGNTY VEIL
Though many U.S. domestic courts have not given full accord to the
LaGrand and Avena decisions, one exception to this rule is the Okla-
homa Court of Appeals, which recently followed the ICJ's Avena holding
in Torres v. Oklahoma. 9 Osbaldo Torres, a Mexican national, was not
notified of his consular rights after being arrested and charged with two
murders in Oklahoma.60 Torres was later convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death, and his federal habeas petition was unsuccessful. Torres
was one of the Mexican nationals in the Avena case; after the ICJ's deci-
sion, the Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Department recommended to
the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board that it carefully review Torres'
case. 6' The Pardon and Parole Board recommended clemency, and the
Governor of Oklahoma commuted Torres' sentence to life without pa-
role. 2 On the same day, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals issued
an order staying execution and remanded the case to determine whether
the violation of article 36 had prejudiced Torres. 3 In a special concur-
rence to the order, Judge Charles Chapel argued that the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution obligated U.S. states to follow treaties. 4 Judge
56. Id.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (e)(2) (1998).
58. The Court further states that even if Breard had not fallen afoul of the procedural
default rule, he would not have likely passed scrutiny under the doctrine of harmless error. If
not procedurally defaulted, a defendant must still show that the adjudication of the claim in
the lower court was both incorrect (based on either the application of federal law or determi-
nation of facts) and objectively unreasonable. Breard, 523 U.S. at 377.
59. Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (on file
with author); see Sean D. Murphy, ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law, 98 AM J. INT'L L. 579, 581 (2004).
60. Murphy, supra note 59, at 582.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Torres, No. PCD-04-442.
64. Id.; see Shelton, supra note 47, at 566.
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Chapel noted that "[a] treaty is a contract between sovereigns. The no-
tion that contracts must be enforceable against those who enter them is
fundamental to the Rule of Law.' 65 With regard to his court's relationship
with the ICJ, Judge Chapel continued:
As this Court is bound by the treaty itself, we are bound to give
full faith and credit to the Avena decision. I am not suggesting
that the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction over this
Court-far from it. However, in these unusual circumstances the
issue of whether this Court must abide by that court's opinion in
Torres's case is not ours to determine."'
Thus, Judge Chapel saw the decision of the ICJ as a self-executing ele-
ment of the VCCR itself, which federal law compelled his court to
follow under federal law.
International lawyers may applaud Judge Chapel and the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals for diving into a torrent into which federal
appeals courts have feared to wade. The most pressing question, how-
ever, persists: are U.S. courts actually bound by ICJ decisions, and if so,
how?
A. Evolving Treaty Interpretation
The Supreme Court's reliance in Breard on lex posterior may not sit
on as firm a foundation as it once did. Now that the ICJ has given further
meaning to the terms of article 36, a genuine conflict between the VCCR
and AEDPA may not actually exist. Indeed, based on U.S. case law, in-
cluding the Charming Betsy decision, the AEDPA and the VCCR can be
interpreted as complementary statutes, thereby obviating the need to ap-
ply lex posterior.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, "all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land,, 67 equally as binding on courts as
the Constitution itself.6 Judge Chapel used this same basic reasoning to
bind the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to the Avena decision.69
Though the reasoning is elegant, the devil is in the details. Two impor-
tant considerations persist when deciding how U.S. treaty obligations
bind U.S. courts under the Supremacy Clause. First, how is the treaty
interpreted, and by whom? Second, what happens when an international
65. Torres, No. PCD-04-442.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
68. See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201 (1975) (treaties are binding
upon states under the Supremacy Clause).
69. See Torres, No. PCD-04-442.
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tribunal interpreting a treaty provision creates requirements directly ad-
dressed to the judiciary?
1. How is a Treaty Interpreted?
There are two schools of thought on treaty interpretation: a treaty
may either be static, with the meaning of its provisions frozen (but per-
haps uninterpreted) at the time the parties ratified it, or it may be
evolutionary, in which case the actual meaning of the words may differ
over time.70 Genuinely static treaties, needing no interpretation, are rare.
Most arguments for authentic interpretation of treaties (or "treaty rigid-
ity") center around large multilateral treaties like the WTO agreements,
where changing the agreement is logistically impossible. 7' At the other
end of the spectrum, giving treaties an evolutionary meaning-in effect
allowing a treaty system to "keep up with what is going on in the
world"-is controversial.72 (Justice O'Connor noted in Medellin, how-
ever, that "the Court has revisited its interpretation of a treaty when new
international law has come to light., 73) In the middle ground are treaties
with rigid language whose nuances, while not yet illuminated, may not
take on new progressive meanings once interpreted. These treaties are
considered open to judicial or political interpretation, aided by the
travaux priparatoires of the treaty, the plain language of the provisions,
or other treaties such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT),74 which specifies the rules by which a treaty may be inter-
preted.75 Although the United States has not ratified the VCLT,
considering it a codification of already existing customary laws of treaty
interpretation, there is a great burden on U.S. courts to interpret the
VCCR according to its provisions.
The structure of the U.S. constitutional system, however, compli-
cates this type of interpretation. Treaties in the United States are
administered via a hierarchy: the Executive branch negotiates the treaty
provisions with other sovereign nations; 7 the Executive and Legislative
70. See John H. Jackson, The Varied Policies of International Juridical Bodies-
Reflections on Theory and Practice, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869, 873 (2004).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2105 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. See generally DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 34-35
(2001) (discussing various "schools" of treaty interpretation).
75. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, part III, § 3, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
76. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 580 (2003) (citing
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases).
77. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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branches ratify the treaty,78 bringing it within the ambit of the U.S. legal
system; and the Judicial branch applies and interprets the treaty as U.S.
law.79 When a treaty provides for binding dispute resolution, as with arti-
cle 1 of the VCCR, an international judicial body may interpret treaty
provisions and issue binding opinions.0 In recognition of variances in
domestic political systems, however, these interpretations are only bind-
ing on the parties to the treaties as states. It is up to each individual state
to determine how it will respect these decisions internally. In this tradi-
tional model, the inner workings of the domestic judicial system are a
"black box" from the point of the view of other states and international
tribunals; the domestic legal system is hidden behind a "veil of sover-
eignty."8'
Under this veil, two important interpretative techniques guide U.S.
courts in reconciling international obligations and domestic structural
limitations. The Supreme Court formulated the first technique in Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy in 1804, holding that "an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other
possible construction remains .. .."" More than 180 years later, the ICJ
employed similar reasoning in a dispute between the United States and
the Palestinian Liberation Organization, finding that the U.S. Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1987 could be read to comply with the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement.83 Despite this pedigree, the Charming Betsy
doctrine has suffered from its inconsistent application in U.S courts.
Some scholars argue that by denying Angel Breard relief under the
VCCR, the Supreme Court in Breard missed an opportunity to employ
the doctrine to show deference to the ICJ's interpretation. 4 Even more
troubling, Breard seemingly abandoned Charming Betsy in the VCCR
context by showing "a preference for domestic doctrine, even
78. Id.
79. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
80. For a history of the development of international judicial procedures starting with
the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899, see SHABTAi ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
LAW OF TREATIES 1945-1986 268-77 (1989).
81. Of course, where the provisions of a treaty specifically address the inner workings
of a state, this would naturally be within the ambit of consideration for an international tribu-
nal. See id. at 272-73 (discussing the limitations of judicial review in treaty disputes).
82. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (em-
phasis added).
83. See Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United
Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, 1998 I.C.J. 1 (Apr. 26).
84. See, e.g., Laura A. Young, Setting Sail with Charming Betsy: Enforcing the Interna-
tional Court of Justice's Avena Judgment in Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 89 Minn. L.
Rev. 890, 905-06 (2005).
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judge-made procedural doctrine, over treaty obligations that had been
freely and voluntarily assumed by the United States .... .""
Compounding the inconsistent application of Charming Besty is the
notion of lex posterior (or the last-in-time rule), the second important
interpretative technique of U.S. courts. Found both in international law
and in U.S. jurisprudence, most notably in the Breard case, lex posterior
holds that if domestic legislation and treaty obligations are in conflict,
"the one last in date will control the other, provided always the stipula-
tion of the treaty on the subject is self-executing. 86 Under the VCLT, as
in the domestic context, lex posterior only applies if two sets of obliga-
tions are incompatible." In Medellin, the Supreme Court reiterated the
principle, espoused in Reid v. Covert and Whitney v. Robertson, that "in
conflicts with [a] subsequently enacted statute, the statute must gov-
ern. ' 8 Indeed, the Court's application of lex posterior in Breard rested
on the assumption of a conflict between the VCCR and AEDPA.
Now that the ICJ has given deeper meaning to the requirements of
article 36, should this assumption still hold? The ICJ in Avena noted that
individuals enjoy rights under the VCCR "irrespective of due process
rights under United States constitutional law,"8 9 which could be inter-
preted as a declaration of the supremacy of VCCR rights in the face of
constitutional due process rights. This outcome, however, seems unlikely
for a tribunal that is highly respectful of domestic constitutional provi-
sions. A more nuanced and arguably more fair reading is that the ICJ
sees the two sets of rights as running parallel to each other, avoiding
conflict and obviating an application of the lex posterior rule.
2. Who Interprets the Treaty?
The deference U.S. courts give to other interpretations of the VCCR
adds another layer of complexity. According to a normative approach to
treaty interpretation, different interpretive results do not necessarily
mean the actual significance of the treaty changes; texts are open to a
variety of interpretations.' Different courts may make different choices
as to interpretation, and so long as these different interpretations do not
claim to be binding on each other, there is no conflict.9'
85. Id. at 900.
86. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
87. Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, supra note 75, art. 30(3).
88. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2098 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. Avena, supra note 2, para. 139.
90. See Ulrich Fastenrath, Relative Normativity in International Law, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L.
305, 332 (1993).
91. Id. (citing M.S. McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 987 (1960)). Wil-
liam W. Burke-White has argued that in situations where there is risk of multiple tribunals
diverging in their interpretation of "general international law," the rules of lex posterior and
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The authority of courts to interpret treaties varies, however.92 Anne-
Marie Slaughter points out that courts have often used "adequate forum
analysis" to determine whether a particular court has sufficient compe-
tency to hear a case. 93 For instance, the Supreme Court has previously
acknowledged that British courts have superior competence to hear ad-
miralty cases.94
In the case of the VCCR, the ICJ alone has interpretative authority.
As Lori Damrosch argues, the binding nature of the dispute resolution
provisions in the VCCR makes the judgments of the ICJ "both an inter-
pretation and an application of the treaty.' 95 Furthermore, Damrosch
explains, "a treaty is not a unilateral act by which one state decides how
far it's going to be bound, but rather it is an international act as to which
there is an authoritative international meaning. 96 In this sense, the ICJ's
opinions override domestic judgments. 97 In his dissent in Medellin, Jus-
tice Souter seemed amenable to this interpretation, writing that final ICJ
judgments "may be entitled to considerable weight, if not preclusive
lex specialis are insufficient and what instead should be created is a set of background legal
rules which would enable courts to resolve conflicts when they arise. William W. Burke-
White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 963, 970 (2004); see generally
Fastenrath, supra note 90, at 335.
92. Fastenrath, supra note 90, at 334. Fastenrath observes that "[t]he capacity of a nor-
mative contention to assert itself will not only depend upon its content but will have to rely
upon external factors also, in particular on the power of the actor or entity who proposes it."
93. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 92-94 (2004).
94. Id. (citing Bremen v. Zapata, 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) ("[T]he Courts of England meet
the standards of neutrality and long experience in admiralty litigation.")); see also Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (agreement to arbitrate
before foreign tribunal upheld); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22, 257-61
(198 1) (action dismissed under forum non conveniens).
95. Curtis Bradley, Lori Fisler Damrosch & Martin Flaherty, Moderator, Discussion,
Medellin v. Dretke: Federalism and International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 667, 677
(2005).
96. Id. at 686.
97. Ulrich Fastenrath points out that interpretations by international organizations em-
powered by express authorization to interpret treaties are called "authoritative" and are
inferior only to "authentic" interpretations by the parties themselves. Fastenrath, supra note 90
at 335-36; see also Commentary of the ILC on Art. 27 of its draft convention on the law of
treaties, H Y.I.L.C. 177, 221 (1967); lOAN Voicu, DE L'INTERPR9TATION AUTHENTIQUE DES
TRAITTS INTERNATIONAUX (1968) (discussing authentic treaties). Fastenrath argues, however,
that international tribunals' interpretations may not necessarily be considered authoritative
because their interpretations are limited in scope to one case, id., as with the limitations im-
posed on the ICJ in article 59 of its statute. We argue below, however, that despite article 59, in
obiter dicta in the Avena judgment, the ICJ applied a more general understanding of the re-
quirements of article 36 of the VCCR.
Another important element in treaty interpretation that is not dealt with in this discus-
sion, but which bears mentioning, is the interpretation of treaties that are authentic in more
than one language. For a treatment of the ICJ's jurisprudence on the authenticity of multi-
lingual treaties, see SHABTAI ROSENNE, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW MISCELLANY 397 (1993).
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effect."98 Similarly, Justice Breyer found that the argument that "Ameri-
can courts are now bound to follow the ICJ's decision in Avena is
substantial.""9 Thus, when the Court concluded that Medellin had not
proven his habeas proceedings were contrary to "clearly established
Federal law"' ° and had not shown a "denial of a constitutional right" 'O'
it may have too hastily discounted the authoritative force of the ICJ's
interpretation in Avena.
Indeed, as Prosper Weil noted, "[t]he rules of general international
law tend no longer to be elaborated .. by the states ut singuli to which
they are addressed, but by the international community of states as a
whole." 10 2 Although Weil addressed the particular problem of select
states defining legal norms for all, his underlying sentiment is rooted in
the idea that international law ebbs and flows with the sentiments of its
players. Acknowledging this reality, the ICJ does not interpret treaties in
a vacuum but, when circumstances warrant, instead tracks an evolution-
ary tendency in international law. For example, in an advisory opinion
regarding the South African occupation of Namibia, the court deter-
mined, based on a progressive reading of the term "well-being," that
South Africa's furtherance of apartheid in Namibia could no longer be
considered as serving the best interests of the native population.' 3 While
the Supremacy Clause makes the language of treaties binding in the
United States, it is progressive interpretation, in this case the interpreta-
tion of the ICJ, that ultimately gives them life and their full meaning.
B. Treaty Execution and the Judicial Dialogue
When determining to what extent U.S. courts are bound to ICJ deci-
sions, there is a gossamer line separating U.S. courts from the U.S.
government. Although the Executive makes treaties and binds the United
States to political-cum-legal commitments, the dialogue between the
ICJ, the U.S. Supreme Court, and lower federal and state courts may
prove the most significant consideration. This dialogue ultimately blurs
the distinction between international law and the law governing U.S.
states, the federal government, and individuals.
98. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2106 (Souter, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2107 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2091.
101. Id.
102. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Nornativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 413, 441 (1983).
103. See generally Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Nanibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J (June 21).
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The point of departure from Judge Chapel's comfortable conclusion
in Torres, then, is the interpretation of the ICJ itself. Indeed, there is no
question that the United States is bound by the provisions of the VCCR,
which it signed and ratified.'0 Until its withdrawal in March 2005,05 the
United States was also under ICJ jurisdiction as a signatory to the Op-
tional Protocol of 1963.' ° The VCCR and the 1963 Optional Protocol
comprise a legally binding set of rules for behavior as well as dispute
settlement. When then-Deputy Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Depart-
ment J. Edward Leyerley submitted the VCCR to the Senate for advice
and consent in 1969, he noted that the United States considered the Con-
vention to be entirely self-executing, requiring no congressional
implementing legislation. 7 Because both the Senate and President
Nixon ratified the VCCR, Leyerley's assertion was never tested in court.
If the VCCR is viewed as a contract between states, U.S. jurispru-
dence supports the idea that the decisions of its specified arbitrator are
part of the Convention itself 9 But in the case of ICJ decisions, what
does "self-executing" actually mean? As Justice O'Connor wrote in
Medellin, "[r]easonable jurists can vigorously disagree about whether
and what legal effect ICJ decisions have in our domestic courts ...."'09
Notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause, treaties are not exactly the "law
of the land." It is an act of Congress that ratifies the treaty, with the
104. The U.S. Senate formally ratified the VCCR and the Optional Protocol on Nov. 12,
1969. It entered into force with respect to the United States on Dec. 24, 1969, and Nixon pro-
claimed the treaty's entry into force on Jan. 29, 1970. 21 U.S.T. 77, 373; 114 CONG. REC.
30997 (Oct. 22, 1969).
105. See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST, Mar. 10,
2005, at Al.
106. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. 1, April 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 8640; SHABTAI
ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT. WHAT iT Is AND How iT WORKS 67 (2003).
107. SEN. REP. No. 91-9, app. 1, at 5 (1969).
108. See E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 61-62
(2000) (stating when parties "have granted to [an] arbitrator the authority to interpret the
meaning of their contract's language ... the arbitrator's award [must be treated] as if it repre-
sented an agreement between [the parties] as to the proper meaning of the contract... "). The
United States took this view in a recent NAFTA Chapter I 1 dispute in which it argued that
applying an interpretation by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, a body empowered to issue
binding interpretations of NAFTA, was not a retroactive application of a new rule, but "an
application of the correct interpretation of the governing law, which remains unchanged."
Response of Respondent United States of America to Methanex's Submission Concerning the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission's July 31, 2001 Interpretation, Methanex Corp. v. United
States, Arbitration Under Ch. I I of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organziation/
6028.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
109. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2102 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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subsequent ratification by the President giving it direct effect."0 In dis-
cussing the relationship of treaty law to domestic law, Justice Marshall
wrote:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is,
consequently, to be regarded as equivalent to an act of the legis-
lature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision. But when, the terms of the stipulation im-
port a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the
judicial department, and the legislature must execute the con-
tract before it can become a rule for the Court."'
Marshall describes the subtle differences between the application of
a treaty provision binding on the U.S. government (the "political") and a
provision binding on the courts. While Marshall is correct in stating that
U.S. courts are bound by self-executing (or "executed") treaties, he is
assuming, in either case, that the treaty has passed through some level of
Executive supervision, be it ratification or negotiation with other states.
Here, the Executive branch represented the VCCR to the Senate as a
self-executing treaty; presumably, ICJ interpretations, as part of the
treaty, are "binding on all state judges notwithstanding anything in state
constitutions or laws .... .2 The idea that treaties trump state law finds
substantial support in U.S. jurisprudence, from Ware v. Hilton, which
held in 1796 that a "treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land, that is
of all the United States, if any act of a State Legislature can stand in its
way,"'"1 3 to U.S. v. Belmont, which in 1937 reaffirmed that "[w]ithin the
field of its [foreign affairs] powers, whatever the United States rightfully
undertakes, it necessarily has warrant to consummate," notwithstanding
"state constitutions, state laws, and state policies ....
What makes the Avena decision unique, then, is not that it mandates
changes on the state level, but that, in seeking a distinctly judicial solu-
tion, it directly addresses the U.S. judiciary and bypasses the Executive.
Although the ICJ reiterates that it is indeed left to the United States to
determine the means by which to give "full effect" to the VCCR,' the
court is quick to stress that the procedural default rule "in itself' is not a
110. Gregory Dean Gisvold, Strangers in a Strange Land: Assessing the Fate of Foreign
Nationals Arrested in the United States by State and Local Authorities, 78 MINN. L. REv. 771,
785 (1994). Because the United States is a dualist system, treaties do not have direct effect by
themselves.
111. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (emphasis added).
112. Bradley, Damrosch & Flaherty, supra note 95, at 675.
113. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (6 Dali.) 199, 236 (1796).
114. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937).
115. Avena, supra note 2, para. 141.
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violation." 6 Rather, it is the application of the rule in U.S. courts that
causes offense.17
While the authority of U.S. courts to apply procedural default rules
is statutorily granted,"' Avena does not call for a statutory solution.
" 9
Instead, the ICJ prescribes a change in how U.S. courts comply with the
statute-a new kind of "review and reconsideration."'' 20 When the ICJ
later states that review and reconsideration should occur within "overall
judicial proceedings," "2 its intended audience has shifted from the
United States as a treaty party to the U.S. judiciary as a treaty-
implementing body.
Despite the requirements of article 59 of the ICJ Statute, the ICJ
considers its review and reconsideration requirement as extending be-
yond the confines of the Avena decision.2 The court confirms this near
the end of Avena: "the fact that in this case the Court's ruling has con-
cerned only Mexican nationals cannot be taken to imply that the
conclusions reached by it in the present Judgment do not apply to other
foreign nationals finding themselves in similar situations in the United
States."' 3 By declaring its holding generally applicable, the ICJ gives
notice not just to the U.S. government but to all courts within the United
States (and perhaps globally) that currently consider article 36 viola-
tions.
As a rebuke of the U.S. criminal justice system's approach to consu-
lar rights violations (which by any measure it clearly is), is not Avena
piercing the veil of sovereignty? Anne-Marie Slaughter suggests such
communication indicates a tendency towards judicial cooperation "that
116. Id. para. 112.
117. Id.
118. See infra Part I1.B, discussing procedural default under AEDPA.
119. Indeed, the ICJ indicated that as the rule had not changed, further consideration was
necessary. Avena, supra note 2, para. 113.
120. Id.
121. Id. para. 141.
122. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59 ("The decision of the Court has
no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.") For a dis-
cussion of the limits of article 59 and the general applicability of ICJ decisions, see I
SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-1996
1627 (1997). It should be observed that when taking a normative approach to the ICJ's holding
in Avena, two parallel obligations become apparent: the United States' obligation to follow the
ICJ's specific holding in this case (as per article 59) and the general obligation of all states that
are signatories to the VCCR to comply with the Convention. The fact that the ICJ gave more
meaning to the Convention provisions in article 36 does not necessarily mean that the actual
holding in Avena can be extended to all other cases in violation of article 59 of the ICJ statute.
See, e.g., Fastenrath, supra note 90, passim (discussing generally the normative approach to
international law).
123. Avena, supra note 2, para. 151.
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transcends national boarders.""'2 She writes: "If an international tribunal
recognizes the importance of the national courts of the countries within
its jurisdiction as enforcers of its decision, it is inviting a kind of judicial
cooperation that melds the once distinct planes of national and interna-
tional law."' 25 By addressing U.S. courts as the domestic enforcers of the
VCCR, and by making its holding generally applicable, the ICJ reaches
beyond traditional interstate interaction and engages in a judicial dia-
logue with U.S. courts-piercing the veil that otherwise divides the two
judicial bodies. 126 Admittedly, this interpretation is highly progressive
and must be teased from the language of the decision, including sections
that are clearly dicta. 27 If ICJ decisions are self-executing, however, a
direct dialogue between the U.S. judiciary and the Hague court may be
the inevitable result.
C. Individual Rights under the VCCR in the United States
Central to understanding how the VCCR binds U.S. courts is deter-
mining whether or not it confers individual rights. If the VCCR does not
confer these rights, then it only binds U.S. courts in so far as it applies to
the United States as a state. Building on the ICJ's conclusion in La-
Grand that the VCCR does confer individual rights, this Part argues that
these rights may apply within the U.S. domestic legal system.
Early in the LaGrand case, the United States argued that the VCCR
confers rights solely on states: "[r]ights of consular notification and ac-
cess under the Vienna Convention are rights of States, and not of
individuals, even though these rights may benefit individuals by permit-
ting states to offer them consular assistance."' 28 As described above, the
ICJ found that the VCCR did confer individual rights, basing its conclu-
sion primarily on the language of article 36 itself.2 9 This emphasis on the
VCCR as a law protecting individuals, rather than a contract between
states, may help U.S. courts reconcile Avena and Breard.
124. SLAUGHTER, supra note 93, at 68.
125. Ann-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191,
194 (2003).
126. The French Institute of International Law in 1993 envisioned exactly such a rela-
tionship between national courts, calling on them to become independent actors in the area of
international law, applying norms of international law and not being beholden to executive
branches of government. See Eyal Benvensti, Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on the
Institut de Droit International's Resolution on "Activities of National Courts and the Interna-
tional Relations of Their States," 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 424 (1994).
127. See, e.g., Avena, supra note 2, para. 151.
128. LaGrand, supra note 2, para. 76.
129. Id. para. 77.
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1. The Supremacy Clause
An examination of the history of the Supremacy Clause sheds light
on this undertaking by illustrating how the Framers of the U.S. Constitu-
tion intended treaties to have the status of law. Because the Articles of
Confederation had very weak enforcement mechanisms for ensuring
U.S. states complied with treaties, the Framers created the Supremacy
Clause to make treaties enforceable in the courts by individuals without
the need for further implementing legislation. 30 Justice Story described
the crucial difference between conceiving of treaties as contracts be-
tween states and considering them as internal law:
[This difference] is exceedingly important in the actual admini-
stration of public justice. If [treaties] are supreme laws, courts of
justice will enforce them directly in all cases, to which they can
be judicially applied ... If they are deemed but solemn com-
pacts, promissory in their nature and obligation, courts of justice
may be embarrassed in enforcing them, and may be compelled
to leave the redress to be administered through other depart-
ments of the government.'
The Supremacy Clause serves to impose the international commit-
ments of the United States on both federal and state courts. In terms of
individuals, the Supremacy Clause does not serve in and of itself to
transfer to individuals rights conferred upon states under treaties. The
Supremacy Clause does, however, give a treaty, where applicable, the
"character of municipal law enforceable in domestic courts at the behest
of private individuals.' ' 2 A primary consideration, then, is whether the
treaty in question provides a private right to individuals.
2. Individual Rights
Carlos Manuel Vdzquez proposes a framework for considering
whether a treaty confers rights on individuals. He envisions his frame-
work as particularly applicable in situations involving:
a foreign national seeking to enforce in the courts of [the
United States] against a state or federal official a treaty provi-
sion that he claims requires the United States to act--or refrain
130. Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J.
INT'L L. 695, 699 (1995).
131. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
695 (1833).
132. Vdzquez, supra note 130, at 700.
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from acting-in a way that affects him, or seeking a remedy
for a claimed violation of the treaty by the official.'33
Vdzquez breaks the framework into three stages: first, does the treaty
impose obligations that are judicially enforceable by individuals within
the United States? 34 Second, if the treaty imposes judicially enforceable
obligations, does an individual have standing to enforce those obliga-
tions? 35 This determination depends in part on whether there is a right of
action within the treaty or whether the individual is using the treaty as a
defense or a means of seeking affirmative relief. 36 Third, if the individ-
ual has standing, the court will have to fashion a remedy. 37 In the case of
international treaties, Vdzquez argues that this remedy may come from
customary international law or the treaty itself.'38
The application of the Vdzquez framework to the VCCR is particu-
larly appropriate. 39 The ICJ in LaGrand found, based primarily on
textual analysis, that the VCCR created individual rights that "may be
invoked in this Court by the national State of the detained person"'
40
Even if U.S. courts are uncomfortable with following the ICJ's lead, in-
dividual rights can be found in the VCCR based on U.S. jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court held that in determining whether a federal statute
confers a "right" on an individual, the first question to ask is whether the
provision creates obligations "binding on the government unit or rather
does no more than express a ... preference for certain kinds of treat-
ment." 4 ' Vdzquez points out that this distinction is analogous to the
distinction between a hortatory or aspirational treaty and a treaty impos-
ing binding obligations. 42 Here, the fact that the VCCR is intended to be
enforced by a judicial body-the ICJ-is evidence that the provisions of
the VCCR are binding on governments.'
3
U.S. courts could apply the same textual analysis the ICJ used in
LaGrand and reasonably conclude, based on U.S. law, that the VCCR's
133. Carlos Manuel V,.zquez, Treaty Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 116 (1992).
134. Id. at 1123.
135. Id. at 1134.
136. Id. at 1141.
137. Id. at 1157.
138. Id. at 1161.
139. Although Vdzquez wrote this seminal piece seven years before the LaGrand case,
his framework is almost perfectly applicable to the situation that arose in LaGrand and Avena,
illustrating the primacy of the legal problem the ICJ faced in both of these cases.
140. LaGrand, supra note 2, para. 77 (emphasis added).
141. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 449 (1991).
142. Vdzquez, supra note 133, at 1124.
143. See V~izquez, supra note 133, at 1124-25 (noting that it could be argued that a
treaty could be considered hortatory if there is no effective mechanism for its international
enforcement).
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clear prescriptions for specific treatment are binding on a state.'" The
Supreme Court has long endorsed the view that individual rights can be
found in international agreements between states. As early as the Head
Money Cases, the Supreme Court found that a treaty may contain provi-
sions that "confer rights upon citizens ... which are capable of
enforcement as between private parties in the courts of other coun-
tries.' ' 5 In more recent times, the Supreme Court has found that self-
executing treaties are enforceable on behalf of an individual.
46
Unfortunately, U.S. jurisprudence on whether article 36 of the
VCCR confers individual rights is mixed: the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Jimenez-Nava stated that article 36 does not confer individual
rights,'147 and a year earlier the Supreme Court in Breard stated in dicta
that article 36 "arguably" confers individual rights.' 8 In her dissent in
Medellin, O'Connor recalls the Breard dicta 49 and finds that the guaran-
tees of the VCCR are "susceptible to judicial enforcement just as the
provisions of a statute would be."' 5° In Jogi v. Voges, discussed below, the
Seventh Circuit echoed this argument, finding that "Article 36 confers
individual rights on detained nationals."' 5'
If, in the future, the Supreme Court decides to follow Jimenez-Nava
and technically not overrule Breard, it would strike a serious blow to the
development of consistent international jurisprudence on the right to be
informed of consular rights under the VCCR. This, however, would not
be the first major blow struck to consistent jurisprudence in this area. In
1999, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated in an advisory
opinion that consular rights granted under article 36 had the status of
human rights.' In contrast, the ICJ in Avena, while not explicitly reject-
ing the notion of consular rights as fundamental human rights, did find
that "neither the text nor the object and purpose of the Convention, nor
any indication in the travaux pr~paratoires, support [that] conclusion."'53
Therefore, while the Supreme Court would be judicious in respecting the
144. See LaGrand, supra note 2, para. 77 (observing that "[tihe clarity of these provi-
sions, viewed in their context, admits no doubt [as to the binding nature of the obligations].").
145. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
146. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992).
147. United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 280 (5th Cir. 2001).
148. Breard, 523 U.S. at 538.
149. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2102 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Breard, 523 U.S. at
538).
150. Id. at 2103 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151. Jogi v. Voges, No. 01-1657, slip op. at 24 (7th Cir. 2005).
152. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, The Right to Information on Consu-
lar Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory
Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/serieajing/
Seriea.16_ing.doc (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
153. Avena, supra note 2, para. 124.
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need for uniform treaty interpretation, the ICJ itself has strayed from this
path on occasion.' "
If the Supreme Court finds that article 36 does indeed confer indi-
vidual rights, it must then determine the status of those rights. As
mentioned above, the Court in Breard held that an article 36 claim, like
any claim arising under the U.S. Constitution, is subject to the proce-
dural default provisions in AEDPA.'-5 If would be difficult for the Court
to justify a wholesale reversal of this decision, even in light of judicial
comity. One possible approach, as discussed above, involves grounding
the article 36 analysis in the idea that ICJ decisions are self-executing
components of the VCCR itself. Thus, the superior interpretative posi-
tion of the ICJ allows its decision in Avena to undermine the 1998
Breard interpretation. The "full effect" requirement in article 36, then,
does not mean foreign nationals must be provided with the same consti-
tutional protections given citizens regardless of whether the protections
offer meaningful relief under the VCCR, as the Supreme Court thought
at the time of Breard. The petitioner's brief in Medellin encouraged the
Court away from this interpretation, arguing that the self-executing na-
ture of the VCCR, along with the binding jurisdiction of the Optional
Protocol, makes the decision of the ICJ "no less [binding] than if the
terms of the decision had been written into the agreement itself.''56 While
the Court deferred addressing this issue, a future decision could find,
based on the Avena decision, that article 36 requires review and recon-
sideration beyond the provisions of the U.S. Constitution.
3. Standing under the VCCR
After determining that the VCCR confers judicially enforceable in-
dividual rights, a U.S. court would have to examine whether a detainee
had standing under the Convention. Vdzquez argues that treaties impos-
ing duties on states are analogous to statutes imposing duties on
administrative agencies: in either case the central question is whether the
litigant has a correlative primary right.'57 The Supreme Court has held
that an individual has standing to enforce a primary right provided by
federal law if the provision in question was "inten[ded] to benefit" the
154. It is important to point out that one element of judicial comity is a greater willing-
ness of international and national tribunals to clash with other courts, engaging each other as
"equals in a common enterprise." See SLAUGHTER, supra note 93, at 87.
155. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
156. Brief for the Petitioner at 35, Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928).
157. Id. For further history of the doctrine of standing in administrative law, see William
A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L. 221, 225 (1988).
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individual."8 In that case, the individual is an "incidental" beneficiary of
the law, 5 9 much like a third-party beneficiary of a contract who can en-
force the agreement between two other parties.' 6
With the VCCR, U.S. courts can again mirror the ICJ's reasoning to
find the same result under U.S. law. As the ICJ pointed out in LaGrand,
while the VCCR is clearly a contract between states, the beneficiary of
the contract, at least in terms of article 36, is not necessarily the state
itself, but rather the individual who is a national of that state.' 61 Individu-
als therefore receive a right through the VCCR and should have standing
under it. In addition, although the VCCR does not expressly provide for
an individual right of action, Vdzquez maintains that this is only impor-
tant for the purposes of standing if an individual is attempting to
maintain an action.62 If the individual is using the statute as a means of
affirmative defense, as was the case in LaGrand and Avena, the statute
need not expressly provide for a cause of action by an individual.
4. Remedies
The final consideration in determining whether the VCCR confers
meaningful individual rights within U.S. courts is whether these courts
can fashion a remedy based on the VCCR. Lack of remedy has been one
of the primary reasons U.S. courts have refused to hear article 36 ap-
peals. 63 But despite the fact that the VCCR does not provide a remedy
for an individual, one could nonetheless be read into the treaty. Indeed,
the Seventh Circuit in Jogi v. Voges found that article 36 confers an "im-
plied private right of action." '6 After concluding that an individual must
be accorded some method for vindicating his treaty rights, the court held
that a civil remedy for damages was "the only avenue left.', 65 The Sev-
enth Circuit found remedies only in the civil context,'6 but its holding
158. Vdzquez, supra note 133, at 1136 (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of
L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)).
159. Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review under Section 1983 and the APA,
91 COLUM. L.R. 233, 257-60 (1991).
160. Vdzquez, supra note 133, at 1136. Because a treaty is in many ways a contract
between nations, the comparison is apt. Id.
161. See LaGrand, supra note 2, para. 77.
162. Vzquez, supra note 133, at 1142.
163. Specifically, courts have held that article 36 does not require a judicial remedy even
if it does provide for an individual right. See United States v. Bustos de la Pava, 268 F3d 157,
165 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000).
See also Simma & Hoppe, supra note 34; John Quigley, LaGrand: A Challenge to the U.S.
Judiciary, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 435,436 (2002).
164. Jogi v. Voges, No. 01-1657, slip op. at 30 (7th Cir. 2005).
165. Id. at 29.
166. Id. at 19.
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confirms the ability of U.S. courts to find individual remedies within the
text of article 36.
While the court in Jogi found a civil right of action for damages by
examining the limitations of the U.S. justice system, Vdzquez argues
instead that rules of customary international law should fill the gap when
a treaty fails to specify a remedy.67 Because states conclude treaties
against the backdrop of the customary rules of international law, these
rules define the secondary rights of parties outside the treaty. 168 The ICJ
in Oil Platforms confirmed this reasoning, rejecting the U.S. argument
that self-defense should be analyzed solely in terms of a treaty provi-
sion;'69 rather, the court held, provisions of a treaty should be understood
"in the light of international law on the use of force in self-defence."'
70
One rule of customary international law relevant to the VCCR dis-
cussion is the requirement that an offending state return an object held
unlawfully.17' Thus, if one state unlawfully (i.e., in contradiction of a
treaty provision) holds the citizen of another state, the offending state is
under an obligation to return that citizen to his status prior to the viola-
tion. Would a U.S. court cite this customary rule or others to conclude
that the VCCR confers a remedy on an individual? The prospect may not
be altogether absurd.
The ICJ in Avena addressed this very concern by requiring the
United States to provide meaningful judicial review of article 36 viola-
tions. 7  U.S. courts could arrive at the same conclusion through the
Supremacy Clause. As mentioned previously, the Framers intended the
167. Vizquez, supra note 133, at 1158.
168. Id. at 1157. The Preamble to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states,
"the rules of customary international law will continue to govern questions not regulated by
the provisions of the present Convention." See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
supra note 75. See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S. Ct. 290, 299 (1900)
("International law is part of our law ... where there is no treaty and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of
labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the
subjects of which they treat.").
169. Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 803 (Dec. 12) paras. 40-
41,44.
170. Id. para. 44.
171. See BROWNLIE, supra note 76, at 446. This stems from a more general obligation to
repair the wrong. See Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13) (stating
that "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed.").
172. See Avena, supra note 2, paras. 121, 140 (stating "the remedy ... should consist of
an obligation on the US to permit review and reconsideration ... with a view to ascertaining
whether in each case the violation of Article 36 committed by the competent authorities




Supremacy Clause in part to allow an individual to cure a treaty violation
by his state.'73 In this sense, the Supremacy Clause can be read to require
courts to provide an individual, at a minimum, with such remedies as
would cure a violation of international law by the United States against
the state of his nationality. 74 In the case of article 36 violations, this
would require giving foreign nationals a full review of treaty violations,
without the procedural bars applicable under U.S. law.'75 This is neces-
sarily a judicial process; as the ICJ stated in Avena,"16 the judiciary is the
best body to determine whether violations of the law occurred.
V. CONCLUSION
Just before the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Medellin, the
Bush administration formally withdrew the United States from the Op-
tional Protocol to the VCCR. This withdrawal could be viewed as
insurance that the current morass in which U.S. domestic courts are em-
broiled will never happen again. Viewed another way, however, the
withdrawal from the Option Protocol is the latest example of the United
States' standing attitude towards the ICJ: when the court's decisions fa-
vor the United States, such as the Iran-Hostages decision, the United
States will participate. When the United States feels the decision will not
go its way, as in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua, it will not. Just before the Nicaragua case, the United States
withdrew from its declaration submitting itself to ICJ general jurisdiction
(under article 36 of the ICJ statute); the latest withdrawal is a natural
extension of the same attitude. This gradual erosion of U.S. respect for
the Hague court is troubling.
The title of this Comment, Rebus Sic Stantibus,17 refers, in this
sense, not to changes in circumstances upon which a treaty is based but
rather to a frame-shift in the political will to respect international law
and international judicial decisions. Notwithstanding the current trend,
however, and regardless of whether the ICJ in Avena actually reached
beyond the United States as a state to speak directly to U.S. courts, the
173. Vdzquez, supra note 133, at 1160.
174. Id. at 1161.
175. On the difference between U.S. due process rights and treaty provisions, see Avena,
supra note 2, para. 139.
176. Id. para. 140.
177. "Rebus sic stantibus" literally means "things as they are in a given situation;" it is
the doctrine that a treaty is made in the context of a situation, and if the situation fundamen-
tally changes then the treaty is no longer binding. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 75, art. 62; JAMES R. Fox, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARA-
TIVE LAW 369 (1992).
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decision has had a significant effect on the U.S. judiciary. On November
7, 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sanchez-Llamas v. Ore-
gon and Bustillo v. Johnson, Oregon and Virginia state court cases that
turn on whether the VCCR confers individual rights, provides for sup-
pression of evidence obtained in violation of these rights, and prohibits
the procedural default rule.' In this time of tension between the U.S.
government and international legal systems, perhaps the Court will rec-
ognize in its newest analysis that direct communication between
international and domestic courts may be the most effective response to
the current change in circumstances.
178. State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 E3d 573 (Or. 2005), cert granted in Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 620 (2005); Bustillo v. Johnson, 63 Va. Cir. 125 (Cir. Ct. 2003). In Vir-
ginia v. Pham, issued on January 3, 2006, Virginia's Fairfax Circuit Court (the same court that
heard arguments in Bustillo) ruled out the death penalty for a defendant because police vio-
lated his rights under the VCCR. Writing for the court, Judge Leslie M. Alden explained:
"Like the operation of the procedural default rule, the idea that the state can completely ignore
its obligations without consequence essentially obliterates the purposes for which the rights
under the Vienna Convention were intended." Virginia v. Pham, Crim. No. K105537 (Va. Cir.
Ct. Jan. 3, 2006), available at http://www.vc3.org/foreignnationals/Corrmonwealth%20v.%20
Pham%20(Va.%2OCir.%2OCt.%202006).pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
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